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SITUATION I . 
NEUTRAL DUTIES AND STATE CONTROL 
OF ENTERPRISE 
States A and B are at war. Other States are 
neutral. State C has an island colony, Camla, 
where there are oil wells operated by the Seeoil 
Co., a privately incorporated concern in 'vhich the 
C government owns 55 percent of the stock and 
selects one-half of the directors. 
(a) State A sends a mission to Camla to pur-
chase the entire outpllt of the wells for the use of 
its navy. As the Seeoil Co. is about to make the 
arrangement, State B protests to State C that such 
a transaction would be a violation of C's neutrality 
obligations. 
(b) The Seeoil Co. sends oil to State D, adja-
cent to State A, to be refined. The Cora, a tanker 
owned by the Seeoil Co. and carrying a cargo of 
crude oil, is encountered en route from Camla to 
State D by the By~ro1~, a cruiser of State B. The 
Byron~ seizes the Cora on grounds of carrying con-
traband. The Cora though not resisting visit and 
search, informed the Byro1~, when first summoned 
to lie to, that the Cora was a public vessel of 
State C. 
(c) A tanker of State E, the Elrod, carrying a 
cargo of gasoline which the owners of the vessel 
have purchased from the Seeoil Co. and are trans-
porting to an island airplane base of State A, is 
visited, searched, and finally seized on grounds of 
unneutral service by the Bax, a cruiser of State B. 
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Instead of placing a prize cre'v on board, the Bax 
directs the Elrod to proceed to a designated port 
of State B and sends Ollt an airplane periodically 
to make certain that the El1~od is not deviating. 
What are the legal rights in each case~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) State 0 should cancel or refuse to have the 
agreement made, thollgh it should have the oppor-
tunity to prove that the tra11saction was purely 
commercial and nonpolitical in character. The ev-
idence in this case, however, does not see1n to sup-
port any such contention on the part of State C. 
(b) Visit and search of the Cora by the By1~ott~ 
'vas legal. 
(c) The Elrod is not guilty of unneutral service. 
It is not impossible that the ElTod was legally 
under the control of the Bax. The question hinges 
upon this point: Was the airplane sufficiently in 
evidence to convince the captai11 of the Elrod that 
he was 'vatched and under control~ 
NOTES 
THE GROWTH OF STATE CONTROL OVER THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
That governmental controls over business and 
enterprise, formerly in private hands, are increas-
ing is an obvious fact today. The era of laissez 
faire is gone. Governments are in business and 
are regulating business on an ever augmenting 
scale. The types of ownership and control are ex-
ceedingly diverse and vary from the direct State 
ownership of practically everything in Soviet Rus-
sia to State licenses and trade subsidies fom1d in 
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so-called capitalist countries. I11 the United 
States, the Government owns and operates, for ex-
ample, the Panama Railroad. The Federal Gov-
ernment also exercises control through the form of 
corporations such as the Ten11essee Valley Au-
thority. It establishes banks, like the Export-Im-
port Bank, or supports semipublic financial insti-
tutions like the Federal Reserve banks. The 
French Government has taken over the arms in-
dustry and owns stocl{ in great corporations like 
the Potash concern. The boundary line bet\veen 
\vhat is governme11tal and what is private can no 
longer be dra\Vll \vith any degree of accuracy. 
Governments may own concerns outright, as pre-
viously suggested, they may appoint some of the 
directors and O\Vn a large share of the stock, as 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., or they may regulate 
enterprise through commissions and other types of 
administrative offices. Any number of examples 
of State intervention through corporations, export 
and import regulatio11s, trade monopolies, cartels, 
and subsidies may be cited, but enough bas been 
said to indicate the fact that more and more hu-
man activities are coming to be regarded as lyi11g 
\vithin the sphere of government. 
The effect upon international la'v of these 
changes within states has been and must be tre-
mendous. As 011e \vriter recently has said: 
International society is in process of a transfor1nation 
which international law can no longer afford to ignore .... 
It is submitted that all the customary rules touching inter-
national state responsibility are, in fact, based upon a par-
ticular division of the spheres of state and individual. 
These rules presuppose that the state has traditionally cer-
tain functions, broadly speaking, the conduct of foreign 
4 
policy, the control of the ar1ned forces, and certain func-
tions of executive government .... 
Apart from the duties corresponding to these state func-
tions, the citizens were free to do and move as they liked. 
In particular, trade and industry _'vas their concern and 
responsibility. ~Iercantilisn1 did not influence these inter-
national principles, partly because its reign was too brief and 
not sufficiently universal, but mainly because the principles 
of international state responsibility ·were developed during 
the 19th century, the century of laissez-faire. (W. Fried-
mann, British Year Book of International Law, 1938, pp. 
118-119.) 
EFFECT OF STATE CONTROLS UPON 
INTERI'-~ATIONAL LAW 
The law between States can11ot help being af-
fected by changes in the law within States. Inter-
natiollal rules are not made in a vacuum, and are 
11ecessarily the product of the way of life of the 
international commlmity. The increasing domes-
tic collectivism has affected both State in1munity 
and State responsibility. States have bee11 prone 
to extend the historic sovereign immunities, 
granted to goverllillental age11cies in days 'vhe11 
governmental business was small, to the ne'v forms 
of State activity. At the same time, the more a 
State has become involved i11 ne'v enterprises, the 
more responsibility it has had to assume. The 
problems of immunity were e11countered first, a11d 
became acute in co11ection with the shipping busi-
ness. \Vhen public vessels 'vere granted immunity 
from local jurisdiction in the case of the Schoone~· 
Excha1~ge vs. ]fcFaddo1~ (7 Cranch 116) no great 
inconvenience in maritime affairs could arise, be-
cause the bulk of the 'vorld's shipping was in pri-
·vate l1ands. Later on, toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, whe11 public ships of a 
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con1n1ercial character bega11 to appear, the difficul-
ties of the immunity doctri11e became more appar-
ent. If immunity was to be granted solely on the 
basis of ov\rnership, then all gover11me11tally o'v11ed 
vessels "\vould be free fron1 suits and local controls, 
a most intolerable situation. The British and 
... A .. 1nerica11 cotlrts, ho,vever, have continued to grant 
immunity to public vessels whether warships or 
freighters, though in practice the administrations 
in these countries have recognized a distinction 
on the basis of the use to which Government ships 
are put. 
The tendency, therefore, is to separate acts of 
State from acts of a commercial sort and not to 
claim i1nmu11ity for the latter. Belgian, Italian, 
a11d Egyptian courts have taken the lead in as-
suining jurisdictio11 over ships which, though 
o'vned by governments, are operating in what 
seen1s to be a nonpolitical or business capacity. 
The Soviet Union has not claimed immunity for its 
commercial age11cies, and the Brussels Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning 
the Immunities of Governments Vessels, "\vhich 
went into effect in 1937, stated in article I that 
"seagoing vessels owned or operated by States 
* * * are stlbject in respect to claims relating 
to the operation of such vessels * * * to the 
same rules of liability and to the sa111e obligations 
as those applicable to private vessels * * *" 
(Hudson International Legislation, III, 1837). 
Also article 26 of the I-Iarvard Draft Code (Ameri-
cal1 Journal of International Law 1932, pp. 716) 
states that: 
A state need not accord the privileges and imn1unities to 
such juristic persons as corporations or associations for 
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profit separately organized by or under the authority of 
another state, regardless of the nature and extent of govern-
mental interest therein or control thereof. 
In connection with legal immtmities therefore, a 
line has been drawn bet,veen the actions of a gov-
ernment in its public capacity and those in a 1)rivate 
capacity. In regard to the responsibility of States, 
the issues have arisen later than they did with 
imn1unities, and as yet the san1e distinction be-
tween the types of governn1ent operations l1as not 
been so clearly apparent. 
NEUTRALITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
In connection with neutrality, questions of re-
sponsibility are grave indeed. According to the 
principles of traditional neutrality, every exten-
sion of government into the realm of finance, trade, 
and business should mean a duty not to permit the 
sale or transfer of the articles or commodities under 
such public control to a belligerent power. Logi-
cally, llnder such a doctrine, a completely socialist 
State like Soviet Russia today could sell 11othing 
and could permit the export of no products to States 
engaged in a war in which Russia was neutral. 
The la'v on tl1is st1bject, however, has not clearly 
crystallized to date. Precedents are relatively few 
and no dogmatic answer to the problem i11volving 
the Seeoil Co. can be rendered. 
Certain fundamental distinctions basic to the 
la\v of neutrality need to be examined. First of 
all, there is the distinction betwee11 the use of neu-
tral territory as a base and its employment as a 
source of commercial supply. Armies and expedi-
tions may not go out fron1 neutral territory but 
belligerent governments may obtain Sllpplies con1-
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mercially. Though goods obtained commercially 
may be far more valuable to a belligerent than the 
assistance obtained from an expedition, the dis-
tinction probably will continue to be recognized 
because of its advantages to belligerents and neu-
trals alike. As long as States wish to buy and sell 
from and to each other they doubtless vvill cling 
to this convenient though not always strictly logi-
cal line of demarcation between the commercial and 
the military. 
Another underlying distinction has been that 
between what a governme11t may do and what a 
private citize11 may do. The law of neutrality 
forbids neutral governments to give aid to a war-
ring power, but permits private citizens to carry 
on trade relations. In regard to the latter, neutral 
governments have no responsibility except to apply 
impartially any regulations or restrictions which 
they may impose. These stipulations have been 
incorporated into the following conventions: 
Hague Convention V of 1907, Article 9. Every n1easure of 
restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral power . . . 
must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents. 
Hague Convention XIII, Article 9. A neutral power must 
apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, re-
strictions, or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admis-
sion into its ports, road-steads, or territorial waters, of 
belligerent warships or of their prizes. 
Article 6. The supply, in any manner, directly or indi-
rectly, by a neutral power, of warships, ammunition, or war 
material of any kind, is forbidden. 
The question inevitably arises as to whether the 
expansion of government controls obliterates this 
distinction between governme11ts and private citi-
zens. Are governments going to be permitted to 
ass-ume a commercial character a11d so be free to 
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sell to belligere11ts, or must the sale by any goveril-
meiltally owned or controlled agency be completely 
prohibited~ If the basic aim of the long-sta11ding 
law is to thwart governn1ental contacts vvith a bel-
ligerent, then logically if the same rules are to per-
sist, governmental instrumentalities must be pro-
hibited from making deals \vith warring powers. 
If the aim, however, 'vas merely to prevent politi-
cal partiality, and if governments in business can 
really act nonpolitically, should not State-owned 
or operated concerns be allowed to function as do 
private persons or concerns~ 
The answers to these questions by variotls au-
thorities have differed. Prof. Lawrence Preuss, of 
the University of ~Iichigan (Some Effects of Gov-
ernmental Controls on Neutral Duties, Proceed-
ings, American Society of International Law, 1937, 
pp. 108-119), tends to take the rather strict line 
that State concerns must abstain entirely from 
belligerent contacts, and the Harvard Draft Code 
(American Journal of International Law, Supple-
ment, July 1939, p. 239) also states ''The rule of 
international law should be and probably is that a 
state whe11 neutral is forbidden to do certain things, 
no matter in what capacity or through what agency· 
it does them.'' The drafters of this code, however, 
\vent on to say by way of modification, that "It 
might be argued that since a neutral state is not 
under a duty to prevent its nationals from doing 
certain things which it shotlld refrain from doing 
itself, so it is not under a duty to refrain from 
doing those acts in its private capacity, provided 
that it accepts the consequence of submitting its 
property to the belligerent rights of capture and 
condemna:tion. '' 
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A different line is taken by Friedn1ann ( op. cit.) 
wl1o argues that abstention would be impractical, 
that it "\vould penalize States u11duly for engaging 
in socialistic experiments and would deprive otl1er 
powers of needed supplies. It does seem as though 
common sense and the actual behavior of States 
dictate the drawing of some kind of a line between 
a State's sovereign and private capacities. Social-
ist-minded nations will not feel bound to abstain 
fro1n business contacts. The solutio11 of the prob-
lem in hand, therefo11e, will be sought upo11 the 
basis of what appear to be the actual needs and the 
legitimate aims of States today. 
THE CRITERION OF PRIVATE CAPACITY 
The endeavor to discover whether a State is op-
erating in its sovereign or personal character is 
immensely difficult, but the elusive nature of the 
problem should not be allowed to halt the search. 
One must commence by enq11iring as to the funda-
nlental reason for the origin of the rule barring 
governmental aid or sales to a State at war, and one 
discovers that it was designed to prevent political 
manipulation in favor of one of the parties to a 
conflict. At the core of neutrality lies imparti-
ality, and governmental assistance, eve11 though ex-
tended with an effort at helping both sides in lil{e 
fashion, seemed incon1patible with the requirements 
of genuine impartiality. Abstentio11 (for govern-
ments) became the rule. Political favoritis1n "\Vas 
to be avoided, and with governments out of the pic-
ture, a11d 'vith most of the commercial area tlnder 
private control, the State 'vas 11ot politically en-
meshed in the conflict. A barrier against politt~cal 
247670-40-2 
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favors was the object, with the prohibition on gov .. 
ernment aid serving merely as a means, not as an 
end in itself. 
If, as suggested, the 'nature of the deal, whether 
political or commercial, and not the fact of gov-
ernment ownership or control, is to be the test for 
determining legal responsibility, and if it is politi-
cal favoritism and political assistance rather than 
governmental Sllpervision as such which gives taint 
to the transaction, then what is to be looked for 
in this quest for a criterion as to private capacity 
is the amount or extent of political bias or influ-
ence manifest in any given arrangement between 
a belligerent government and a corporation or 
agency owned or controlled by a neutral State. 
The sending of armies, warships, and military sup-
plies by one government to another is clearly politi-
cal; likewise the granting of loanB by a govern-
ment bank would be political, prin1a facie. All 
such acts could properly be regarded as illegal 
because they could only be made with a definite 
political end in view. In an earlier age when the 
functions of government were fewer and when they 
were confined mainly to matters of police and de-
fense, the legal ban on governn1ental assistance 
affected only this relatively narrow range of politi-
cal activity. Now that governments are engaged 
in all sorts of enterprise taken over from the 
private domain, they are increasil1gly involved in 
matters more commercial than political. The pro-
hibition against governmental transactions with a 
belligerent, designed to prevent assistance for po-
litical purposes, is no longer so essential where 
business and trading interests are concerned. 
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To determine private capacity by means of bard 
and fast .forn1ulae seems unsatisfactory. Percent-
ages of stock, numbers of directors, or forms of 
control do not in themselves furnish an adequate 
index of the amount of political direction involved. 
Where a government owns and operates a railway 
in very businesslike style, transportatio11 of belli-
gerent goods over such a line 'vould not appear to 
affect the State's neutrality. On the other hand, 
industries mainly under private o'vnership may be 
guided or controlled indirectly by a gover11ment, 
in a very partial manner. The questi011 to be 
asked, therefore, is whether the government in any 
given situation is active for political reasons. At 
issue are affirmative, political acts. If the I1eu-
tral governme11t merely allows its railways or ship-
ping lines to operate without overt i11terference on 
its part or if it follows a policy of laissez faire, 
passively leaving matters to geography and the 
course of events, neutrality duties would not be in-
fringed. It is admitted that the abandonment of 
a definite criterion such as govern111ent ownership 
or a specified amount of ;control involves great 
difficulties. It means a search into the motives 
and into the details of each particular act, and it 
would be far easier to apply some mechanically 
rigid rule by which one might l{now immediately 
whether a certain act 'vere illegal or not, but in the 
light of governments' obyious desire and need to 
continue trading, it is essential to seel{ a criterion 
of private capacity 'vhich fits the practical 11eeds 
of the 'vorld today. 
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APPLICATION OF PRIVATE CAPACITY CRITE-
RION TO THE PRESENT CASE 
The transactio11 bet\veen State A a11d the Seeoil 
Co. is of doubtful legality, and in the circu1nstances 
State C should prevent it. This co11tract seems 110 
ordinary one of a com1nercial 11ature. The poli-
tical infltlence of State C in its official capacity 
seems to show through the entire set of Ilegotia-
tions. The fact that State A se11t a mission to 
Camla brings in a11 elen1ent of diplomatic relations 
between States whch evidently goes beyond a purely 
business deal. Also the fact that State C is to 
purchase the entire ot1tpt1t of the wells for the use 
of its navy n1akes the contract seem decidedly politi-
cal. In a situatio11 of this sort, State C should be 
extremely careful and should not allo"\\7 any agree-
ments to be made which haYe definitely un11eutral 
implications. The law on this subject is ad1nittedly 
fluid, but after more experience and \vith more 
precedents, a private capacity criterio11 should 
emerge as clearly as it already has in co1mection. 
with immunity from ju11isdiction. 
State C should be given the opportunity to den10ll-
strate that the contract \Vas commercial. Tl1e deal 
seems suspiciously political, and the burde11 of 
proof is llpon State C, but the latter can cite prec-
ede11ts fron1 the \Var of 1914-18 to show that neutral 
governn1ents may agree to sell to as \vell as to buy 
from belligerent po,vers. Government-sponsored 
organizations lil{e the N. 0. T. in the Netherla11ds 
and the S. S. S. in S\vitzerland negotiated directly 
with States at war, and on August 5, 1916, i11 an 
agreement betwee11 Great Britain and N or\vay, the· 
latter pron1ised to supply Britain \vith 85 percent 
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of its exports of fish. (SeeP. G. Vig11ess, "Neu-
trality of N or,vay and the World War"; .Amry 
Vanden bosch, ''Neutrality of the N etl1erlands Dur-
illg the World War''; Harvard Draft Code, ''Rights 
and Duties of Neutral States n1 Naval and Aerial 
War"; American Journal of I11ternational Law, 
Supplement, July 1939, pp. 235-245; Harvard 
Draft Code, ''Competence of Courts in Regard to 
Foreign States''; American Journal of Interna-
tio11al La,v, Supplement 1932, Co1nments on Arti-
cles 12, 26, and 27; Friedn1a11n, op. cit., a11d Preuss 
op. cit.) 
VISIT AND SEARCH OF PUBLIC VESSELS 
In the ligl1t of the evide11ce previously cited to 
the effect that State-owned vessels engaged in com-
mercial enter})rise are not to be regarded as im-
mune from jtlrisdiction, it is apparent that a 
tanker like the Cora, thougl1 o\vned by a company 
in which the State owns a majority of the shares, 
cannot claim immunity from visit and search. It 
is to be treated as a private vessel. In the early 
spring of 1940 warships of Great Britain inter-
cepted Soviet vessels in the Pacific Ocean, visited 
and searched them, and ordered then1 into port for 
prize-court adjudication. The Government of the 
Soviet Union allegedly protested that these ships 
'vere immune from visit and search because of their 
State ownership. Such a claim was inconsistent 
'vith previollS Soviet policy in regard to its mer-
cllant marine, and evidently was not taken seri-
ously by any of the parties concerned at the time. 
Exemption from the exercise of belligerent rights 
of 'var for State-o'\vnecl merchant craft is unnec-
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essa1·y a11d 'vould be asking an unwarranted sacri-
fice from a belligerent naval power. 
That State craft are not all entitled to the im-
munities accorded warships has been Tecognized 
in international conventions: 
Convention on Commercial Aviation, Havana 1928, Arti-
cle III (b) : All state aircraft other than military, naval, 
customs and police aircraft shall be treated as private air-
craft and as such shall be subject to all the provisions of the 
present convention. 
Hague Convention XI, Relating to the Exercise of the 
Right of Capture in naval war. Article II: The inviolabil-
ity of postal correspondence does not exempt a neutral mail 
ship fron1 the laws and customs of maritilne war as to neu-
tral merchant ships in general. r.rhe ship, however, may not 
be searched except whenever absolutely necessary, and then 
only with as much consideration and expedition as possible. 
THE "ALTMARK" CASE 
On February 16th, 1940, the British destroyer 
Cossack forced the German vessel .L4ltmark into 
a Nor,vegian fjord and re1noved three-hllndred-odd 
captives who were on board. The Altrnark had 
formerly been a n1erchant tanker but at tl1e time of 
the incident was a naval auxiliary flying the Ger-
man official service flag. .Although the Altmark 
case deals with a neutral State's duties in regard 
to belligerent ships in territorial \Vaters, and 
though it does not concern belligerent rights over 
neutral public ships on the high seas, it is of con-
siderable general importance and i11volves inter-
esting problems concerning jurisdiction over ves-
sels, both public and private, within the territorial 
limits. The British governme11t and some inter-
national lawyers charged that Norway had failed in 
its duties and that it should not have allowed the 
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Altrnark to transport prisoners along its coast. 
More careful examination of the situatio11, ho\v-
ever, indicates that Norway bad no obligation to 
halt the Altmark, to force it to leave, to inter11 it, 
or to release the prisoners. Following is the opin-
ion of Prof. Edwin Borchard of Yale University: 
As a public ship the Altmark was free from visit and in-
spection except possibly to verify her conformity with Nor-
way's neutrality regulations. Norway's jurisdiction over the 
vessel was at best extremely limited and under no circum-
stances 'vould it seem that Norway was privileged to break 
the relation between the master and the captives on board 
and release them. Even if the ship had anchored or docked 
in Bergen, that legal relationship could not have been legally 
broken. In the Franco-Prussian War, a French war vessel 
entered the Firth of Forth with German prisoners on board, 
whereupon the German Consul at Leith asked Great Britain 
to release the prisoners in accordance with Britain's alleged 
neutral duty. The British government replied that the 
French warship was privileged to enter and to remain for a 
limited time, that the prisoners on board did not become free, 
that 'vhile on board they were under French jurisdiction, and 
that the neutral authorities had no right to interfere with 
the1n. In an earlier case arising during the Crin1ean War, 
Attorney General Cushing in an exhaustive opinion held that 
a United States court had no po,ver to release the captive sea-
men on board the Russian vessel Sitka brought into San Fran-
cisco as a prize by a British man-of-war. 
Nor is it material what the Altmark's papers showed, pro-
vided she was a public vessel. Even if she were a merchant 
vessel, Norway as a coastal state had no power to punish her 
for carrying false papers, or, in either event, for the false 
character of the captain's answers to the questions put. The 
British seamen were not technically prisoners of war be-
cause they were not part of the armed forces of a belligerent 
nor ancillary thereto. Even if it should be said that the AU-
mark was violating international law by taking the1n to Ger-
many instead of leaving them at the nearest port, it was 
hardly Norway's duty to correct the violation. The term 
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"prison ship" is not a tern1 of art and hardly clarifies the legal 
position. The Altnwrk would seem to have been under no 
duty to account to Norway for what she was carrying, nor 
was Norway bound to inquire 'vhether she was passing 
through territorial waters to escape capture. Such a 1notive 
'vhich was doubtless accurate, does not diminish the privilege 
of using the territorial waters for transit (American Journal 
of Inte~national Law, April1940, pp. 292-294). 
SEIZURE FOR CONTRABAND 
Though there is no binding general international 
agreement as to what articles should properly be 
considered contraband, the seizure of both the Cora 
and the El1·od appears legitimate. Oil and gaso-
line are now of the utmost importance in \Varfare 
and may rightly be considered to be absolute con-
traband. The basis for the seizure of the Cora, 
which was carrying oil to a State adjacent to a 
belligerent, was that of continuous voyage, a doc-
trine recognized as applicable to absolute contra-
band in the unratified Declaration of London of 
1909 and extensively invoked in the war of 1914-18 
and in the war which began in September 1939. 
The law is therefore clear in regard to the Cora 
but is by no means as definite in regard to the 
extensions of the doctrine of continuous voyage 
in both great wars. In these two conflicts the .Al-
lied States never proclaimed a formal blockade of 
Germany but relied upon contraband, continuotis 
voyage, and reprisal orders which carried the doc-
trine to almost unrecognizable lengths. 
17 
CONTRABAND LISTS OF THE 1939-40 WAR 
Great Britai1~: 
"SCHEDULE I 
"Absolute Contraband 
" (a) All kinds of arms, ammunition, explosives, chemi-
cals, or appliances suitable for use in chemical ·warfare and 
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts 
thereof; articles necessary or convenient for their use; mate-
rials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles nec-
essary or convenient for the production or use of such mate-
rials or ingredients. 
"(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means o£, 
transportation on land, in the water or air, and machines 
used in their manufacture or repair; component parts 
thereof; instruments, articles, or animals necessary or con-
venient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their 
manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the pro-
duction or use of such materials or ingredients. 
" (c) All means of communication, tools, implements, in-
struments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other arti-
cles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for car-
rying on hostile operations; articles necessary or convenient 
for their manufacture or use. 
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also 
metal, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles 
necessary or convenient for their manufacture. 
"SCHEDULE II 
''Conditional Contraband 
" (e) All kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and cloth-
ing and articles and materials used in their production." 
(The Department of State Bulletin, September 16, 1939, 
Vol. I, No. 12, Publication 1377, pp. 250-251.) 
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"ARTICLE 1 
"The following articles and materials will be regarded as 
contraband (absolute contraband) if they are destined for 
enetny territory or the enemy forces: 
"One. Arn1s of all kinds, their component parts and their 
accessories. 
"Two. Atninunition and parts thereof, bombs, torpedoes, 
1nines and other types of projectiles; appliances to be used 
for the shooting or dropping of these projectiles; powder and 
explosives including detonators and igniting 1naterials. 
"Three. 'Varships of all kinds, their component parts and 
their accessories. 
"Four. ~filitary aircraft of all kinds, their component parts 
and their accessories; airplane engines. 
"Five. Tanks, ar1nored cars and armored trains; arn1or 
plah~ of all kinds. 
"Six. Chemical substances for military purposes; appli-
ances and machines used for shooting or spreading then1. 
"Seven. Articles of military clothing and equipment. 
"Eight. ~feans of cormnunication, signaling and military 
ilhnnination and their component parts. 
"1Vine. ~feans of transportation and their component parts. 
"Ten. Fuels and heating substances of all kinds, lubricating 
oils. 
"Eleven. Gold, silver, n1eans of payn1ent, evidences of 
indebtedness. 
''Twelve. Apparatus, tools, n1achines and materials for the 
manufacture or for the utilization of the articles and products 
named in numbers one to eleven. 
''ARTICLE 2 
"Article one of this law beco1nes article 22 paragraph one 
of the Prize Law Code. 
"This law becomes effective on its protnulgation." 
The Government of the Reich on September 12, 1939, n1ade 
an announcetnent relating to conditional contraband which 
read in part : 
"1"'he following is accordingly announced: 
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"The following articles and 1naterials will be regarded as 
contraband (conditional contraband) subject to the condi-
tions of article 24 of the Prize Law Code of August 28, 1939 
(Reichsgesetzblatt part one page 1585) : 
"Foodstuffs (including live anin1als) beverages and tobacco 
and the like, fodder and clothing; articles and 1naterials used 
for their preparation or manufacture. 
"This announce1nent beco1nes effective on Septe1nber 14, 
1939." 
(The Department o£ State Bulletin, Septe1nber 2:3, 1939, 
Vol. I, No. 13, Publication 1380, p. 285.) 
Fra'nce: 
"The Government of the F'rench Republic makes known 
to interested parties, that, during the course of hostilities, 
it will consider as articles of contraband the following 
objects: 
"AnsoLUTE CoNTRABAND 
" (a) All sorts of arms, munitions, explosives, chemical 
products or apparatuses which may be utilized in chemical 
warfare, and n1achinery intended for their 1nanufacture or 
repair; component parts of these articles, articles necessary 
or appropriate for their utilization; substances or ingredi-
ents employed in their manufacture ; articles necessary or 
appropriate for the production or utilization of these sub-
stances or ingredients ; 
"(b) Combustibles of all sorts; all apparatuses or means 
permitting of the transportation on land, water or in the 
air, and all machinery utilized for their 1nanufacture or 
repair; component parts of these articles; instruments, ar-
ticles or animals necessary or appropriate for their employ-
ment, substances or ingredients untilized in their manufac-
ture; articles necessary or appropriate for the production 
or employment of the said substances or ingredients; 
" (c) All means of communication, tools, imple1nents, in-
struments, equipment, geographic maps, pictures, papers and 
other articles, machinery or documents necessary or appro-
priate for the conduct of enemy operations, articles neces-
sary or appropriate for their n1anufacture and their 
employment; 
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" {d) Coins, gold and silver ingots, bunk notes, bonds, as 
well as n1etals, materials, specie, metal sheets, machinery or 
other articles necessary or appropriate for their manu-
facture. 
"CoNDITIO~ AI., CoNTRABAND 
"All sorts of foodstuffs, provisions, products for feeding 
animals, fodder, clothing, us well as objects and material 
utilized for their production." 
{The Departn1ent of State Bulletin, Nove1nber 18, 1939, 
Vol. I, No. 21, Publication 1405, p. 555.) 
AMERICAN POSITION CONCERNING BRITISH 
"'BLOCKADE" 
Note of Decen~berr BJ 1939: 
"My Government has noted with regret that by its Order-
in-Council of Novernber 28, the British Government has 
undertaken to intercept all ships and all goods emanating 
:from German ports, and ports in territory under German 
occupation, after December 4, 1939, and all ships from what-
ever port sailing after December 4 having on board goods of 
German origin or German ownership, and to require that 
such goods be discharged in a British or allied port and 
placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court. This 
order if applied literally would subject A1nerican vessels to 
diversion to British ports if they are found to be carrying 
goods of German origin or German o'vnership, regardless of 
the place of lading of such goods or the place of destination 
and regardless of the ownership of the goods at the time that 
the vessel is intercepted, the "\Vords 'enemy origin', according 
to the order, covering any goods having an origin in any ter-
ritory under enemy control, and the words 'enemy property' 
including goods belonging to any person in any such 
territory. 
"Interference with neutral vessels on the high seas by bel-
ligerent powers must be justified upon some recognized bel-
ligerent right. It is conceded that a belligerent government 
has a right to visit and search neutral vessels on the high seas 
for the purpose of determining whether the vessel is carrying 
contraband of war to an opposing belligerent, is otherwise. 
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engaged in some form of unneutral service, or has broken or 
is attempting to break an effective blockade of an enemy port 
and, if justified by the evidence, to take the vessel into port. 
"A1nerican vessels are at the present time. prohibited by 
our domestic law from engaging in any kind of commerce on 
the 'vest coast of Europe between Bergen, Norway, on the 
north, and the northern part of Spain on the south. This 
prohibition applies to neutral as 'vell as to belligerent ports 
'vithin that area. Consequently, justification for interfer-
ing 'vith American vessels or their cargoes on grounds of 
breach of blockade can hardly arise. Likewise the question 
of contraband does not arise with respect to goods en route 
from Ger1nany to the United States. 
"vVhatever may be said for or against measures directed by 
one belligerent against another, they may not rightfully be 
carried to the point of enlarging the rights of a belligerent 
over neutral vessels and their cargoes, or of otherwise penalis-
ing neutral states or their nationals in connection with their 
legiti1nate activities. 
"Quit.e apart from the principles of international law thus 
involved, the maintenance of the integrity of which cannot 
be too strongly emphasized at this time 'vhen a tendency to-
'vard disrespect for law in international relations is threaten-
ing the security of peace-loving nations, there are practical 
reasons which move my Governn1ent to take notice of the 
Order-in-Council here in question. In many instances orders 
for goods of Ger1nan origin have been placed by American 
nationals for which they have made pay1nent in whole or in 
part or have otherwise obligated the1nselves. In other in-
stances the goods purchased or which might be purchased can-
not readily, if at all, be duplicated in other markets. These 
nationals have relied upon such purchases or the right to pur-
chase for the carrying on of their legitimate trade, industry 
and professions. In these circumstances, the British Govern-
1nent will readily appreciate why my Government cannot view 
with equanimity the measures contemplated by the Order-in-
Council, which, if applied, cannot fail to add to the many in-
conveniences and damages to which innocent trade and coin-
Inerce are already being subjected. 
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"~Iy Government is, therefore, under the necessity of re-
questing that measures adopted by the British Government 
shall not cause interference 'vith the legitimate trade of its 
nationals and of reserving meanwhile all its rights and the 
rights of its nationals whenever, and to the extent that they 
1nay be infringed." 
(Deparbnent of State Bulletin, December 9, 1939, Vol. I, 
No. 24, Publication 1413, pp. 651-652.) 
At.de ~ie1noire, January 20, 1940: 
''This Government feels constrained to express its serious 
concern at the treatment by the British authorities of Ameri-
can shipping in the ~fediterranean area, and particularly 
at Gibraltar. It has already made clear its position as 
regards the legality of intBrference by the British Govern-
ment 'vith cargoes moving from one neutral country to 
another, in its Ambassador's Note number 1569 of November 
20, 1939. In addition, it now regrets the necessity of being 
forced to observe not only that British interference, carried 
out under the theory of contraband control, has worked a 
wholly unwarrantable delay on American shipping to and 
fron1 the ~Iediterranean area; but also that the effect of 
such action appears to have been discriminatory. 
"Since ample tin1e has elapsed to permit the setting up of 
an efficient system of control, it would seem that the present 
situation can no longer be ascribed to the confusion attend-
ant on early organization difficulties. 
"From information reaching this Govern1nent it appears 
that A1nerican vessels proceeding to neutral ports en route 
to or :from ports of the United States have been detained 
at Gibraltar :for periods varying :from nine to eighteen 
days; that cargoes and mail have been removed from such 
ships; that official mail :for American missions in Europe 
has been greatly delayed; that in some instances American 
vessels have been ordered to proceed, in violation of Ameri-
can law, to the belligerent port of Marseille to unload car-
goes and there to experience :further delays. It is further 
reported that cargoes on Italian vessels receive more favor-
able consideration that similar or equivalent cargoes carried 
by American ships, and that Italian vessels are permittBd 
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to pass through the control w·ith far less inconvenience and 
delay. 
"There is attached a list of American vessels en route to 
neutral ports detained by the British Contraband Control 
during the period Nov. 15 to Dec. 15, from which it will be 
seen that the average delay imposed has amounted to ap-
proximately 12.4 days. From information in possession of 
this govern1nent, it is established that Italian vessels de-
tained during the same period were held for an average 
delay of only 4 days. 
"This government must expect that the British Govern-
ment will at least take suitable and prompt measures to 
bring about an immediate correction of this situation. It 
will appreciate receiving advices that the situation has been 
corrected." 
ENCLOSURE: 
List of American vessels, as stated. 
DEPARTl\IENT OF STATE, 
Washington, Jan. 30,1940. 
American vessels reported to the Department of State to 
have been detained by the British Blockade Control in the 
Mediterranean for examination of papers and cargo, Nov. 
15-Dec. 15, 1939 : 
S. S. Express--(Nov. 12-21), ten days. An1erican Export 
Line-general cargo-detained by the British authorities 
at Malta. Held pending receipt of instructions from the 
British Government. Had remaining on board 420 tons of 
general cargo for Greece, Turkey and Rumania. Free to 
depart Nov. 21 in view of declaration furnished. Departed 
Nov. 23. 
S. S. Nishmaha-(Nov. 11-23) thirteen days. Lykes 
Brothers Steamship Company-cotton, paraffin, beef cas-
ings-detained by the British authorities at Gibraltar. 
Large number of items of cargo seized. Free to depart 
after Nov. 17 on captain's undertaking to unload at Bar-
celona cargo for that port, and to proceed to l\1arseille for 
unloading seized items. 
S. S. Examiner-(Nov. 17-Dec. 4) eighteen days. Ameri-
can Export Line-general cargo, oil, grease, rubber tires,. 
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cotton goods-detained by the British authorities at Gibral-
tar. Eleven bags first-class mail removed. 
S. S. Excambion-(Nov. 20-27) eight days, American 
Export Line-general cargo, oil, films-detained by British 
authorities at Gibraltar. 
S. S. Exmouth-(Nov. 22--Dec. 5) fourteen days. An1eri-
can Export Line-general cargo-detained by British 
authorities at Gibraltar. 
S. S. Extavia-(Nov. 29-Dec. 14) sixteen days. American 
Export Line-mixed cargo-detained by the. British author-
ities at Gibraltar. Ship free to depart on giving Black 
Diamond guarantee in respect to one item o£ cargo. 
S. S. Exochorda-(Dec. 5-13) nine days. American Ex-
port Line-mixed cargo, burlap, tinplate, tobacco, oil-
detained by the British authorities at Gibraltar. 
S. S. Exmoor-(Dec. 7-15) nine days. American Export 
Line-1nixed cargo-detained by the British authorities at 
Gibraltar. 
S. S. Explorer- (Dec. 9-23) -fifteen days. A1nerican 
Export Line-mixed cargo-detained by the British 
authorities at Gibraltar. 
(Department o£ State Bulletin, January 27, 19-:1:0, \T ol. II, 
No. 31, Publication 1428, pp. 93-94.) 
THE "CITY OF FLINT" 
On October 9th, 1939, the .American n1erchant 
steamer City of Flint was visited and searched by 
a German cruiser at an estimated distance of 1,250 
miles from New York. Tl1e Flinl, carrying a 
mixed cargo destined for British ports, was seized 
by the German cruiser on grounds of contraband, 
and a German prize crew 'vas placed on board. 
Between the 9th of October and the 4th of Novem-
ber 1939 the American ship was tal{el1 first to the 
Norwegian port of Tromsoe, then to the Russian 
city of Murmansk, and then after two days in the 
last-named port, bacl{ along the Norwegian coast 
as far as Haugesund where the Norwegian author-
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ities on November 4th released the Flint 011 the 
grou11ds of the international la'v rules contained 
in articles XXI and XXII of Hague Convention 
XIII of 1907. Prizes may be taken to a neutral 
harbor only because of an "inability to navigate, 
bad conditions at sea, or lack of anchors or sup-
plies.'' The entry of the Fli1~t into Haugesund on 
N oven1ber 3 was not justified by the existence of 
any one of these ,conditions. The original visit 
a11d search and seizure of the Flint by the German 
'varship, the placing of the prize cre'v on board, 
and the conduct of that crew were apparently all 
i11 accord vvith law. The stay in the harbor of 
l\iurmansk, l1ovvever, 'vas of dotlbtfullegality. No 
genuine distress or valid reason for refuge in a so-
called neutral harbor is evident from the examina-
tion of the facts. Perhaps the Germans and the 
Russians hoped to invoke the provisions of Article 
XXIII of Hague Convention XIII which author-
izes a 11eutral po,ver to permit "prizes to enter its 
ports and roadsteads * * * when they are 
brought there to be sequestrated pending the deci-
sion of a prize court.'' This article has never been 
accepted generally as a part of international la'v 
and 'vas specifically rejected by the United States 
in ratifying the conventio11. The situation 'vas 
con1plicated b~y the eqt1ivocal position of Soviet 
Russia which was not a neutral in the traditional 
se11se, in the European war. Under strict rules 
of international la'v the U. S. S. R. was derelict 
i11 regard to its neutral duties and should not have 
permitted the Fl-i1~t either to enter lVIurmansl{ or to 
find any sort of a haven there. 
247670-40-3 
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NORWEGIAN STATEMEN'I' ON THE "CITY OF 
FLINT" 
The Foreign Office finLls it correct to give the co1nplete ac-
count of how the German prize, Oity of Flint, has been han-
dled by Norwegian authorities. 
The Oity of Flint is an American vessel which, with a Ger-
man prize crew aboard, c~une for the first ti1ne to Tron1soe on 
Oct. 20 and asked for fuel and water. Per1nission 'vas given 
in accordance with Norwegian neutrality rules of 1928 based 
upon the international agree1nents about neutrality duties in 
mariti1ne warfare of Oct. 18, 1907 (The Hague agreen1ent 
~umber 13). 
The Flint, however, was orderd to remain son1e hours long-
er than necessary for taking on fuel and water. Thus it 
en1erged that it had British citizens aboard. Crews had been 
taken off one or 1nore vessels 'vhich Ger1nan warships sank 
and these British citizens, according to a request fron1 the 
prize ship, were put ashore at Tromsoe. 
The Oity of Flint left Tromsoe on Oct. 21 and, because the 
stay there had been prolonged according to the N or,vegian 
order, the ship obtained pern1ission to continue to sail within 
N or\\'egian territories for t1renty-four hours reckoned on the 
tin1e of departure from Tron1soe. 
This 'Yas in accord with N or,vegian neutrality rules. 
On the follow·ing day, which was Sunday, the Gern1an 
Charge d'Affaires at Oslo said his government found it in-
correct that the stay within Norwegian territorial waters be 
Ji1nited this \\ray and asked that the ship be allo,ved to con-
tinue within Nor,vegian territorial waters. 
The Foreign Office ans,vered on Oct. 25 by citing the neu-
trality rules. The Gern1an charge d'affaires then caine back 
'vith new overtures on the follo,ving Sunday, Oct. 29. 
The German Govern1nent maintained the N or,vegian 
Government had supposed incorrectly that the prize should 
be treated in the same 'vay as a 'varship and the Gern1an 
Government was of the opinion that, according to The 
Hague agreement of 1907, the prize could remain in transit 
in Norwegian territorial waters 'vithout a tiine limit. 
The Norwegian Foreign l\1inister ans"~erecl the next da}" 
that as far as the question about transit of prizes and ''ar-
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ships, they " ·ere placed under the sa1ne footing in The 
Hague agree1nent, but in this case there had not been a 
(1uestion about transit but about a stay in a neutral port 
and about the leaving of the port. 
On the question about the transit in neutral 'vaters~ the 
Foreign niinister declared himself in agreen1ent "'ith the 
Gern1an GoYernment. 
'This last question beca1ne effective that san1e day. 
'fwo hours before the Foreign ~finister sa\v the Gern1an 
charge d'affaires, the C'ity of Flint had anew entered the 
harbor of 'fro1nsoe, follo,ving the \vat€rs from the north 
from )!urmansk. 1'his tilne the vessel did not stop but 
only asked permission to continue south. 'There \vere no 
hindrances and the vessel continued southvvard in N orwe-
gian waters. 
When this became known, the possibility arose that an-
other warfaring power would try to stop the ship on its 
"~a)r. To control the boat as long as it W'as in Nor,vegian 
territory and to safeguard Nor·way~s neutrality, the Nor-
''"egian admiral in command ordered a Norwegian naval 
ship to accompany the City of Flint southward. 
Farther south, the boat was met by the Olav Trygvasson, 
". hich took over the watch. 
Outside of Sogn (a fiord north of Bergen), the chief of the 
(/ity of Flint reported a sick man aboard and said that he 
should be permitted to stop at Haugesund to get the n1an 
under medical treatment . 
. A. doctor ·was sent aboard fro1n the Olav Trygvasson and 
"·hen he had seen the sick man had only an insignificant 
\vound in the leg, the chief of the City of Flint was in-
formed he could not for this reason be pennitted to anchor 
at Ha ugesund. The prize chief agreed. 
The (/ity of Flint, despite this, anchored at Haugesund 
on Xov. 3 in the evening and \Yhen the captain of the 
Olav 11ryg·va8son 'vent aboard and asked "~hy he put at 
anchor, the prize chief ans,vered "according to orders fro1n 
1ny go,·erninent ." lAtter he said he "·anted to confer 'vith the 
Ger1nan Consul at Haugesund. 
The Hague Agreeinent of 1907, "~hich had been ratified by 
both the Gern1an and N or,vegian Governments aucl "·hich 
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had been referred to expressly by the Gennan GoYennnent 
in connection 'vith the City of Flint's stay at rfron1soe, states 
in Article XXI that prizes can be taken to a neutral harbor 
o"·ing "only to the inability to navigate, bad conditions at 
sea~ or lack of anchors or supplies." 
None of these conditions 'vas present. 
If none of the conditions is present, 1\..rticlc XXII says 
"the neutral po,ver must giYe free the prize "·hich has been 
brought into harbor." . 
In accordance with this, the City of Fli,nt during the night 
\YHS taken out of the prize coininancler's po"·er and "·as giYen 
free "·hile the prize cre\v was interned ten1porarily on the 
0 lav Trygvasson. 
Early next morning, the City of Flint left Haugesund 
On that san1e n1orning, Nov. 4, the German charge cl'af-
:faires at Oslo delivered to the Norwegian Foreign ~Iinis­
ter a protest against the way in "\vhich K or,vegian authorities 
had acted in connection with the City of Flint. 
The N or"~egian Foreign l\iinister on the spot sho,ved the 
protest was without reason and that N or,vegian authori6es 
acted exactly in accordance with 1"he Hague agreen1ent rules. 
The German Minister demanded the c~~ty of Flint be held 
back as long as the case 'vas discussed bet,veen the two gov-
crnnle.nts, but the :N or,vcgian Gover1unent found no legal base 
on ''hich to take such steps against the American boat. 
The whole action in this matter has been explained by the 
N or,vegian Government in a note 'vhich today has been 
delivered to the German charge d'affaires. 
(N C\V York Times, N oven1ber 6, 1939.) 
TREATMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MAILS 
As i11 the war of 1914-18, an exchange of notes 
took place during the Winter of 1939-40 bet\veen 
tl1e Govern1ne11ts of the United States a11d Great 
Britain on the st1bject of seizure and censorship 
of tl1e mails. Tl1e A1nerican Governme11t admitted 
that the British bad a right to censor private mails 
which normally passed through British ports or 
territory, bllt denied the Tight of Great Britain to 
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interfere \vith A1nerica11 mails on neutral ships on 
the l1igl1 seas or 011 sl1ips whicl1 entered British 
ports i11volu11tarily. The United States Govern-
l11ent based its case, just as it did 2'3 years before, 
on Hague Conve11tion XI, \vhich specified that 
]Jostal correspondence is i11violable 011 the high seas. 
During the \Var of 1914-18 the American Goveri1-
ment had agreed that only "genuine" correspolld-
ence \Vas immune from search and had co11ceded 
that 'vl1ere n1ail \vas used as a cover for the ship-
111e11t of contl'aband articles it \Vas no longer '' ge11-
lli11e '' a11d so no lo11ger i11violable. This left ope11 
tl1e question: Ho\v \Vas the belligerent (Great Brit-
ail1) to decide or to find out whether the mail was 
truly ''genuine'' or not~ The practical ans\ver was 
that all was subject to ope11i11g because, in effect, 
tl1e belligerent had to ope11 all mail i11 order to fincl 
out whether it ought to have opened the mail! The 
position of the American Government \Vas thus not 
a particularly strong one whe11 it came to protest-
illg mail censorship during the war which bega11 in 
September 1939. The British in the~r reply \vere 
quicl{ to point out that the United States in 1916 
had already ''admitted in principle the right of the 
British authorities to examine 1nail bags \vith the 
view to ascertan1ing whether they contained col1-
trabanc1. '' The strong \Vording of the Hague Co11-
Ye11tion has thus been e1nasculated in practice a11cl 
all correspo11de11ce, in fact, seems to be subject to 
belligere11t i11terference. 
A 1nerica1~ ?Lote, J wnuary 2, 1940: 
"1'he United States Deparbnent of State has been advised 
that British authorities have removed from British ships and 
from American and other neutral ships American mails ad-
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dressed to neutral countries and have opened and censored 
~ealed letter Inail sent fro1n thjs country. 
·'1'he :follow·ing cases runong others ha Ye con1e to the De-
partinent of State's attention: On October 10 the British 
authorities took from the stea1nship Black Gull 293 sacks of 
.1\n1eriran Inail addressed to Rotterdam and ten sacks ad-
dressed to .A.nt,,erp. On October 12 authorities in the Downs 
ren1oYed fron1 the Zaa.nda1n 77 sacks of parcel post~ 33 sacks 
of registered n1ail, and 156 sacks of ordinary mail addressed 
to the Netherlands, as 'veil as 65 sacks of ordinary 1nail ad-
dressed to Belgitnn, four to I.Juxemburg, three to Danzig and 
259 to Ger1nany. On October 12 authorities at ,,~eyn1outh 
reinoYed from the Black Tern 94 sacks of American n1ail ad-
dressed to Rotterda1n, 81 to Ant,,erp and 184 to Ger1uany. 
On October 24 authorities at Kirk,,all reinoYed fron1 the 
A.stJ·id-11horden 468 bags n1ail fron1 :Ke'v York to Gothen-
burg and 18 bags from :Ke,v York to Helsinki. ~Iany indi-
Yidual instances of British censorship of .1\Jnerican 1nails 
ha,;e con1e to the Department's attention. 
"This GoYernment readily acbnits the right of the British 
Goyern1nent to censor private 1nails originating in or destined 
to the United I\::ingdon1 or priv-ate mails "'"hich norn1ally pass 
tlu·ough the United I\::ingdon1 for trans1nission to their final 
destination. It cannot achnit the right of the British author-
ities to interfere w·ith 1\.merican 1nails on American or other 
neutral ships on the high seas nor can it admit the right of the 
British GoYernJnent to censor n1ail on ships 'vhich have in-
voluntarily entered British ports. 
"The eleYenth Hague ConYention recognizes that postal 
correspondence of neutrals or belligerents is inviolable on the 
high seas. The United States Govern1nent believes also that 
the s:une rule obtains regarding such correspondence on ships 
w·hich haYe been required by British authorities to put into a 
Briti~h port. 'This vie'v is substantiated by Article 1 of the 
ConYention 'vhich stipulates: 'If the ship is detained, the 
correspondence is for" .. ardecl by the captor 'vith the least pos-
sjble delay.' 'I:'he United States Government regards as par-
ticularly objectionable the practice of taking mails fro1n 
Yessels which ply directly bet,veen American and neutral 
European ports and 'vhich through son1e form of duress are 
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induced to call at designated British <:ontrol bases. This is 
believed to be a clear violation of' the i1nn1unity provided by 
the IIague Convention. 
"The Unit eel States Government feels compelled to 1nake 
a vigorous protest against the practices outlined above and to 
express the hope that it will receive early assurances that they 
are being discontinued." 
(The Departlnent of State Bulletin, January 6, 1940, VoL 
II, No. 28, Publication 1422, p. 3.) 
Br-itt.sh re]Jly, J a.n1tary, 17, 1940: 
"ONE. I have the honour to invite reference to your note 
No. 1730 of the 27th December in which you drew attention to 
certain specific instances of the removal fro1n British, United 
States and other neutral ships, and of the examination by 
the British censorship authorities, of United States mail ad-
dressed to neutral couHtries and of sealed letter mail des-
patched fron1 the United States. You also stated that your 
GoYernment admitted the right of His l\fajesty's Govern-
Inent to censor private mails originating in or destined for 
the United J{ingdom or private 1nails "\vhich normally pass 
through the United J{ingdom for trans1nission to their final 
destination, but that in vie"\v of The Hague Convention No. 
11, your Govern1nent could not achnit the right of the 
British authorities to interfere with United States mail in 
United States or other neutral ships on the high seas or to 
censor n1ail in ships "\vhich have involuntarily entered British 
ports. 
"T'VO. His l\1ajesty's Government in the United ICing-
donl are happy to note that there is substantial agreen1ent 
bet,,een the1n and the United States Government as regards 
the rights of censorship of tern1inal mails and that the only 
point of difference seems to lie in the interpretation of The 
Hague Convention in regard to correspondence in ships 
which are diverted into British ports. 
"THREE. The vie"\v of His l\1ajesty's Government as re-
gards the exa1nination of·1nail in ships on the high seas or 
involuntarily entering British ports is that the immunity 
conferred by Article I of The Hague Convention No. 11, 
which in any case does not cover postal parcels, is enjoyed 
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only by genuine postal correspondence, and that a belligerent 
is therefore at liberty to exa1nine mail bags and, if necessary, 
their contents in order to assure hin1self that they constitute 
such correspondence and not articles of a noxious character 
such as contraband. This view n1ust, in the opinion of His 
)fajesty's Govern1nent, be regarded as established by the 
practice during the 'Yar of 1914-1918~ w·hen none of the 
belligerents accepted the view that Article I of this conven-
tion constituted an absolute prohibition of interference 'vith 
n1ail bags, and the general right to search for contraband 
"~as regarded as covering a full exan1ina tion of 1nails for 
this purpose. Reference to the correspondence betw·een the 
United States Govern1nent and His ~fajesty's Governn1ent 
in 1916 shows that at that date the United States ad1nitted 
in principle the right of the British authorities to exan1ine 
1nail bags with a view to ascertaining " .. hether they con-
tained contra band. 
"FOUR. It will be appreciated that the letter post as well 
as the parcel post can be used to convey contraband; and 
that even though letters 1nay be addressed to a neutral 
country their ultimate destination may be Germany. For 
instance, the letter mails 1nay be used to convey securities, 
cheques or notes or again they 1nay be used to send indus-
trial diamonds and other light contraband. It must be 
ren1embered that the lin1it of size,. weight and bulk of 
letters sent is sufficient to allo" .. the passage of contraband 
of this nature which 1nay be of the utJnost value to the 
enemy. 
"It was presu1nably for this reason that the United States 
Government in their note of the 24th l\Iay, 1916, stnted 
that "The Government of the United States is inclined to 
the opinion that the class of n1ail mutter "~hich includes 
stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities is to be re-
garded as of the sa1ne nature as n1erchandise or other 
articles of property and subject to the san1e exercise of 
belligerent rights. l\Ioney orders, cheques, drafts, notes and 
other negotiable instruments "rhich may pass as the equiva-
lent of n1oney are, it is considered, also to be classed as 
tnerchandise." 
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"It is clear that in the case of merchandise His ~fajesty's 
Government are entitled to ascertain if it is contraband 
intended for the enemy or ''hether it possesses an innocent 
character, and it is impossible to decide whether a sealed 
letter does or does not contain such merchandise without 
opening it and ascertaining what the contents are. It 'vould 
be difficult to prevent the use of the letter post for the 
trans1nission of contraband to Germany, a use 'vhich has 
been Inade on an extensive scale, without submitting such 
1nail to that very examination to 'vhich the United States 
Government is taking objection. 
"FIVE. The Allied govern1nents in their correspondence 
'vith the United States Government in 1916 also had occa-
sion to demonstrate the extent to 'vhich the mails 'vere being 
employed for the purpose of conveying contraband articles 
to Germany. The position in this respect is identical today, 
and, in this connection, I have the honor to invite reference 
to an aide me1noire dated the 23d November, 1939, which 
was con1municated to a 1ne1nber of your staff and in 'vhich 
clear evidence 'vas given of the existence of an organized 
traffic in contraband on a considerable scale bet,veen German 
sympathizers in the United States and Germany through 
the mail. 
"1\..n article in a newspaper published in German in the 
United States, which was handed to him at the same time~ 
sho,ved that an organization existed in United States terri-
tory for the purpose of facilitating this traffic. 
"SIX. Quite apart from transmission of contraband the 
possibility 1nust be taken into account of the use of the letter 
post by Ger1nans to trans1nit 1nilitary intelligence, to promote 
sabotage and to carry on other hostile acts. It is in accord-
ance ''ith international la 'v for belligerents to prevent intel-
ligence reaching the enen1y 'v hich might assist them in hos-
tile operations. 
"SEVEN. I may add that in another respect, namely, the 
destruction of 1nails on board ships sunk by the illegal 
methods of 'varfare adopted by Ger1nany, the situation today 
is identical 'vith that 'vhich existed in the 'var of 1914-1918. 
Bet,-veen the 3d September, 1939, and the 9th January, 1940, 
the German naval authorities have destroyed, without pre-
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Yious ""arning or Yisit, in defiance of the rnles of "·ar and of 
obligations freely entered into, the S. S. Yorkshire, the S. S. 
Dunbar Castle, the S. S. Sin1on Bolivar and the S. S. Teru-
kuni :31aru, all of w·hich are known to have been carrying 
1nails to or fro1n neutral countries, ''ith as little regard for 
the safety of the neutral correspondence on board as for the 
li , .. es of the inoffensive passengers and ere"... Yet His niaj-
esty's Govern1nent are not aware that any protest regarding 
this destruction of postal correspondence has been 1nade to 
the German Government. 
"EIGHT. In contrast to this reckless and indiscri1ninate 
destruction of neutral property, the exan1ination conducted 
by His l\fajesty's Govern1nent of the n1ails w·hich are under 
discussion does not involve innocent 1nail being either con-
fiscated or destroyed. In accordance with the terms of The 
Hague Convention, 1nail found in ships which have been 
diverted to British ports is forwarded to its destination as 
soon as possible after its innocent nature is established. In 
no case is genuine correspondence fron1 the United States 
seized or confiscated by His Majesty's Government. 
"NINE. For the above reasons His l\fajesty's Government 
find themselves unable to share the vie" .. s of the United 
States Govern1nent that their action in examining neutral 
n1ail in British or neutral shipping is contrary to their 
obligations under international law. They are, how·ever, 
desirous of conducHng this examination with as little incon-
venience as possible to foreign nations~ and you may rest 
assured that every effort has been and will be n1ade to reduce 
any delays which 1nay be occasioned by its enforcement. 
"If the United States Government have occasion to bring 
any specific co1nplaints to the notice of His l\fajesty's Gov-
ernn1ent concerning delays alleged to be due to the exan1ina-
tion of these mails, His l\fajesty's Govern1nent w·ill be happy 
to exa1nine these co1nplaints in as acco1n1nodating and 
friendly a spirit as possible. ''Thile the task of exa1nination 
is rendered heavy as a result, it is believed that arrangements 
"~hich have been 1nade to deal with this correspondence ''ill 
insure that all genuine correspondence will reach its desti-
nation in safety and with reasonable dispatch." 
(The Deparhnent of State Bulletin, January 27, 1940, 
Vol. II, No. 31, Publication 1428, pp. 91-93.) 
CAPTURE, ESCORT, AND CONTROL BY 
WARSHIP AND AIRPLANE 
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In Situation I the Cruiser Bax of State B did 
not place a prize cre\v on board the Elrod; instead 
an airpla11e was sent out by the Bax "periodically" 
to 1nake ce1-tain that the ElrorZ did not deviate. 
The issue is not one of deviation before visit and 
search, a proble1n \vhich \vas extensively considered 
by the Commission of Jurists in 1923 a11d in Naval 
''Tar College International La'v Situations in 1930 
and 1938. Rather, tl1e question is one of deviation 
c~Jfter capture. Under international law the com-
mander of a belligere11t cruiser which has cap-
tured an enemy mercbant111an or seized a neutral 
vessel bas the option of placing a prize crew on 
board or of escorting the ship into port. What 
is crucial in such a situation is that the captured or 
seized vessel be under the effective control of tl1e 
belligerent. A mere order to proceed to a speci-
fied destination need not be obeyed by the captured 
or seized craft \Vhicb is legally free to sail where 
it 'vishes if the control over it is no longer main-
tained. khe captured ship has no right to attempt 
to escape or deviate, but if co11trol ceases the Iner-
chant ship is at liberty./ The belligere11t cruiser, 
acting as escort, or the prize crevv, n1ust operate 
i11 such a \Vay as to convince the captain of tl1e 
seized ship that l1e is u11der actual constraint. Tl1e 
questio11 is both one of fact and of thought as to 
the fact. Objectively,4be case might be one in 
\vhicb the belligerent captor did 11ot have the physi-
cal force to maintain his authority but if he per-
forn1ed in such a \vay as to create a reasonable 
belief in the minds of those on board the capttlred 
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Yessel that such authority could be Inai11taii1ecl, the11 
legall~y the belligerent \vould be in control. There 
is tl1e famous story about the British stea1ner A.p-
pcun which \vas captured in 1916 by the German 
cruiser 11Ioe~ve. The Gern1ans could not spare 
1na11Y n1en for a prize cre\v, and to bolster their 
authority they told the British that they had 111ined 
the AJJpant and could blo\v it to bits at the slightest 
sig11 of insubordination. Whether the Appam was 
really mined or not, and whether the English crevv 
really \vould have had the power to retake com-
n1a11d, does not change the fact that by their actions 
a11d tactics the Germans gave convincing evidence 
of co11trol. 
In each case of capture and seizure exan1ination 
has to be made into this question of control. Cata-
gorical assertio11s as to tl1e size of the prize cre\V 
or as to the distance bet\veen the escort and the 
escorted are impossible and useless. Instead, the 
law must employ a rtlle of Teason, and a judicial 
authority would have to decide whether n1 a given 
insta11ce adequate effort had bee11 made by the cap-
tor to convince the captured that he was i11 control. /'*£ sufficient authority had been made manifest to 
111ake plain to any sensible, rational person that l1e 
coulcl110t proceed freely, then legally control could 
be said to exist./ In the case at hand, the Bax se11ds 
out the airplane periodically. This 111ight seem 
at first as if control existed only \Vhen the airplane 
"ras actually \vithin the sight of those on board the 
Elrocl. It might be argued by some that either the 
Bax or the airplane must be physically present 
ever~y moment in order to maintain its authority, 
a11d it is true that on the face of it, a dangerous 
precedent might be set if such periodic visits \vere 
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too readily condoned. The rules require tl1e bel-
ligereilt to make so1ne effort in retllrn for coi11pli-
ance on the part of the seized or captured ship; 
the la'v is a se11sible compromise bet,veen the bel-
ligerent's natural desire to capture a ship and to 
go on his way after merely issuing an order, and 
the merchantman's wish to break away and resume 
his nor1nal course after capture. If the law i11 
regard to co11trol is too greatly relaxed, grave da11-· 
gers n1ay be foreseen; belligerents could capture,. 
give orders, sail after other ships a11d then atte111pt 
to penalize the vessels 'vhich it had 11ot bothered 
to escort and which it might have reencolu1tered. 
Undue advantage would thus accrue to belligere11t 
'Yarships. 
In the case of the Elrod} however, it is not abso-
lutely certain that the Bax by means of its airplane 
is 11ot in control. The airplane may be lool{ed 
llpon as an extension of the guns of the Bax a11d 
i11 tl1ese days of radio, a warship out of sight over 
the horizon might escort and keep control for a 
time over a merchantma11 which v.rould be withi11 
the range of the warship's gu11s a11d v.rould have 
reason to believe that it 'vas not "free." If the 
airpla11e appeared sufficiently often, or if the war-
shi}) 111ade it clear that it 'vas keepli1g watch i11 
effective fashion, there 'vould be no release fron1 
co11trol. The poi11t at isslle is whether, u11der the 
circumstances, the airplane 'vas arou11d enough to 
co11vince the Elrod captain that he 'vas being 
\Vatched ancl controlled. How much is '' e11ough'' ~ 
Ho'v often is ''sufficiently''~ These are questio11s 
\vhich the con1111a11der of a 'varship or the judge 
of the prize court must answer and must decide 
in terms of what is reasonable in the particular 
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sitnatio11. Therefore, though the actio11 of the Bax 
is ope11 to grave criticisn1, and though it 1nay lool{ 
like an un\Yarranted attempt to prevent deviatio11 
b}r 1neans of ineffective control, it 1nust be adinit-
ted that the use of radio and airplane demands a 
greater flexibility i11 the application of the old rules 
\vhich required the actual physical presence of an 
acco1Ilpa.nyj11g vvarship. The action of the Bax. 
is 11ot necessarily illegal, a11d careful scrutiny of 
all the facts n1ight reveal that there \Vas sufficient 
evide11ce of control to make the Elrod}s captain 
believe that the physical might of tl1e plane or 
1varship could be exerted at a11y n10111ent. 
RESUJ\f:E 
It is plain that the rules of international law are 
being profollndly affected by the social and tech11i-
cal develop1nents of tl1e prese11t epoch. Collectiv-
jstic tendencies are forcing a reexaini11atio11 of tl1e 
fni1dH111ental postulates of neutrality, and it seems 
inevitable that adjustments must be made to per-
111it the continllation of commerce betvvee11 bellig-
ere11ts and neutrals despite the advance of govern-
111ents into the terrain formerly occupied by private 
enterprise alone. Lil{ewise in matters pertaining 
to contraband, the maintenance of blockades and 
the exercise of control over captured vessels, the 
i11troduction of the airplane, of the radio, and of 
other devices in this ne\v power age, raise ne\v 
problems in regard to the application of the old 
rules. This is not to assert that changing condi-
tioilS or ne\v methods of \Varfare justify the aban-
do1nne11t of former legal restraints. It does mean, 
llo\vever, that inter11ationallaw, like domestic la\v, 
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n1ust keep i11 tuucl1 'v1th its social, economic, and 
lJolitical e11vironn1ent. La,v sta11ds for order but 
it must also allo'v for change, and the task of adapt-
ing rules to shifti11g conditio11s is a 11ever-e11ding 
one. 
SOLUTION 
( ct) State C should ca11cel or refuse to have the 
agreement n1acle, thot1gh it should have the oppor-
tunity to prove that the transaction was purely 
co1nn1ercial a11d nonpolitical in cl1aracter. The 
evidence in this case ho,vever does not seem to 
support any st1ch contention on tl1e part of State C. 
(b) Visit and search of the Cora by the Byro1~ 
'vas legal. 
(c) The Elrod is not gt1ilty of tlnneutral serv-
ice. It is not impossible that the Elrod "\Vas legally 
under the control of the Bax. The qt1estion l1inges 
upon this point: vVas the airplane sufficiently in 
evidence to co11vince the captain of the Elrod that 
l1e 'vas 'vatchecl and t1nder control~ 
